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facts on regulatory  reform  in telecommunications  and its  tradeoffs that emerge  from the complex issues involved.
effects on telecommunications  development and Internet  It will  also require  a commitment to developing
penetration  in Latin America.  Relying on data from the  analytical instruments,  such as cost models,  to sort out
International Telecommunication  Union, the  many of the problems.  Appropriate cost rnodels will
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income  distribution,  and access to primary infrastructure  All these changes  will ultimately  require  a stronger
are  the main determinants  of growth in Internet  commitment by competition  agencies,  since in many
connections  and use).  countries  a failure to negotiate interconnection
Regulation  will work by cutting costs. Cost cutting will  agreements will raise competition  issues just as often as it
require that regulators in the region take  a much closer  will raise  regulatory questions.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Latin  America  is  betting  on  the  potential  "new  economy"  productivity  payoffs  from
telecommunications  reform.  It  wants  fast improvements  in  the  quantity  and  quality  of its
information  and  communications  technology.  Chile's  Telecommunication  Subsecretariat
optimistic growth target estimate  issued in mid 2000 for fixed line, mobile phone services and
internet  products  for  the  next  decade  is  quite  illustrative.2 By 2010,  it  expects  fixed phone
penetration to more than double to reach 49%, mobile penetration to triple to 60%  and internet
access  to  quadruple  to  about  50%  of  the  population.3 Similar  statements  made  by  key
policymakers  from Argentina  to  Mexico  suggest that this optimism  is shared  throughout the
region.  The  underlying  assumptions  are:  (1)  the  liberalization  of the  sector has  progressed
enough to allow the countries of the region to now make the most of cheaper technologies and
lower costs of access to web enabled telecommunications  technologies and services;  (2)  once
supply has increased  enough,  most policymakers  expect demand to follow quickly thanks  to
the diffusion  of the  new technologies  throughout  the region  which requires  very little  input
from  the  government  besides  ensuring  the  liberalization  of the  telecoms  sector  and  (3)  this
should significantly  contribute  to  close the  gaps  between  the poorest  and the richest  across
and within countries.  4
We are grateful to M.  Celani,  E. Engel, L. Guasch,  A. Galetovic, B.  Mueller and P. Noumba for useful
feedback  on an earlier version.  The views expressed  in this paper are however our own and should not be
attributed to any of the institutions  we are affiliated  with. Any mistake is obviously ours and ours only.
2  Latincom (2000), "Chile's  optimism greeted with skepticism", October 6'h, p.  12.
3 For comparison purposes, currently,  41%  of the US population has a computer.
4 Some  authors  have serious  doubts that these benefits  will  be  evenly distributed  and  talk about the  risks of a
digital divide  among nations  without an explicit  government intervention.  See Norris (2000)  and Rodriguez and
Wilson (2000).  This is not addressed  in this paper.
1The  generalized  optimism  underlying  these  assumptions  seems  somewhat excessive
for now.  The  main purpose  of this paper  is to show  that there  is still  a strong role  for the
government  in the sector  to make  sure that  the new  economy  spreads  its expected  benefits
throughout the region.  Indeed,  the  paper shows that competition  is not that great yet in Latin
America's  telecom  sector. Moreover,  we show  that much  needed  regulation,  in  particular  in
the area of interconnection  rules,  still needs to be introduced  in the non-competitive  segments
of the  business  if the  telecommunications  sector  is  to  be  competitive  enough.  Effective
competition  and regulation are particularly important if telecom reforms are going to allow the
new economy to yields gains for everyone.
The empirical  analysis  of this paper shows that regulatory actions  is needed  because
once one accounts  for unobserved  country specific  characteristics,  there  is little evidence  to
support  the  view  that  an  exogenous  internet  diffusion  process  is  taking  place  in  Latin
America.  In other words, this evidence - and our results are necessarily limited by the paucity
of the available  data - makes a case  for the  need of policy interventions,  in particular  in terms
of access to phone  lines (fixed  or mobile) that are still  lacking in the region.  In that context,
we  show how  the main  regulatory  determinants  of access  rules  in  Latin  America drive the
odds  of  integration  of  networks  and  hence  the  incentives  for  investments  in
telecommunications  infrastructure  needed to sustain the diffusion of internet in the region.
The paper  is organized as follows.  We first review  some stylized facts on reform  and
its effects on the level of telecommunications  and  internet penetration  in the region as a weak
test of the  widespread  "cyber-optimism"  of its politicians  (section  2).  In  section  3, we  test
econometrically  the determinants  for the differences  in internet  penetration  rates around  the
world and  in the region,  including  tests of the importance  of regulation  as  a determinant of
cross-country  differences  in  Latin  America.  In section  4,  we  summarize  some  of the main
regulatory  issues  that  will  have to be  addressed  by  telecoms  regulators  in  the region.  The
section  provides  the  main  lessons  from  the  theory  relevant  to  the  outstanding  regulatory
agenda in  the region. In particular,  we highlight all  the issues regulators must consider  when
designing interconnection agreements.  Section 5 concludes.
2. WHAT ARE THE OUTCOMES OF A DECADE OF INSTITUTIONAL  CHANGES?
A  combination  of the  poor  historical  performance  of  the  public  enterprises  which  had
traditionally  been running the  sector,  of fiscal crisis  slowing down  government  financing of
their  investment  deficits  and  new  opportunities  allowed  by  technological  progress  have
2resulted  in major institutional  changes  in the sector.  The  1990s have  seen all countries  in the
region essentially adopt new laws aiming at liberalizing  telecoms and have implemented them
at least partially, with the major exceptions  of Uruguay  and Costa Rica. Moreover,  out of the
20  countries  sample  covered  by  Table  1, about  75%  have  fully  or  partially  privatized  the
historical operator.5
The  goal  was  also to  introduce  competition  at  least  gradually.  The  dissemination  of
cellular  phones,  the  opportunities  for  call  backs  and  other  technology  changes  forced
competition  into  the  sector  in  many  countries.  Most  have  some  degree  of competition
although often with restrictions.  This can be seen  in the generous exclusivity  periods  for the
first entrants  in the business after  privatization.  These  first entrants  were  typically  strategic
investors  which took some  risks and wanted  some  protection for those risks,  at least during
the  early  1990s.  In exchange,  governments  demanded  investment  commitments  to improve
coverage and service quality. The main exception has been Uruguay where a 1992 referendum
resulted in the rejection of changes in the sector and in particular of its liberalization.  In some
other  countries,  including  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador  and  Honduras,  political  and  economic
problems  postponed the  actual  reforms but Table  1 shows that the  major laws have  already
been  introduced.
An  additional  important  change  has  been  the  creation  of independent  regulatory
agencies.  Table  1 reveals that  in  most  countries these  agencies  are  sector  specific  and are
accountable  to  a  ministry  rather  than  to  the  head  of state  or  to the  parliament.  In  many
countries, the main threat to their  independence  from political  interference  results from their
lack of financial  autonomy.  As  long as a minister  is expected to sign off a budget transfer to
finance the regulator's expenses,  there is a risk of conflict of interest in regulatory decisions.
The final institutional  change worth  mentioning  is the one that  has not happened yet!
While  basically  all  countries  have  in  fact  introduced  the appropriate  legislation  and  while
most of the regulators  have  defined  the basic  regulatory  principles they  intend to follow  on
most  issues,  the  supporting  regulatory  analysis  is  still  lagging.  Take  the  example  of the
regulatory regime.  Most Latin American  countries have  decided to rely  on a price  cap which
implies  that  the  regulator  must  have  some  idea  of the  efficiency  gains  realized  by  the
operators since this gain will eventually have to be shared with the users. No country has yet
defined the methodology  to be followed  to assess these gains, leaving  the regulatory decision
open to negotiation.  Regulatory  gaps  like this one  seem not to have had dramatic  impacts  in
5 All the data used and quoted in this document  is from the ITU data base unless otherwise specified.
3the  region,  probably  because  of the combination  of a competitive  international  environment
and of continuous technical changes which drive costs and tariff down.
All  in  all  the outcome  associated  with the  reforms  has been quite impressive  so  far.
Table  2  summarizes  key  performance  changes  during  the  1990s.  These  are  dramatic  -
reflecting the joint effects of reform  and of technology  changes - but are not  sufficient.  For
instance, even if the growth in the number of phones/100 inhabitants  has increased by close to
40%  between  1996  and  2000, phone  penetration  is  still only about 25%  of what it is  in high
income countries (31  residential main lines per 100 households  in 1998 for Latin America and
the Caribbean  vs.  113  for North  America).  The gap  in  access  to phone services  is however
closing with the acceleration  in the penetration of the cellular phones - from  100,000 in 1990
to 39  million  in  1999. One in every 4 phone users  in Latin  America now relies on mobile. In
Paraguay  and  Venezuela,  cell  users outnumber  fixed phone  users.  Also,  service quality  has
improved.  For instance, faults are dropping  and waiting times to get new phones  continue to
decrease  (in fact,  they have converged  to zero  as  many users  can now  simply  get a mobile
phone).  And finally,  connection  fees and subscription charges  are falling as well, completing
the overall positive impression on the outcomes of  the reform.
There  are  also  problems.  First,  most  governments  in  the  region  do  not  seem  to
appreciate  that  getting  the  "privatization"  deals  done  is  the  easy  part.  Introducing  and
enforcing a regulatory regime that results in outcomes mimicking the effects of competition is
the  hard  part  and  most  governments  tend  to  underestimate  its  importance.  Indeed,  while
restructuring  and  privatization  have  taken  place  quite successfully  in  most  countries of the
region, the implementation  of the regulatory agenda needed to ensure the full potential reform
payoffs  is still  lagging and  competition  continues  to be restrained  in many  subtle ways.  For
instance,  Latin  America  counts  many  Internet  Telephony  Service  Providers  (ITSPs)  which
capture  both terminating  and  originating  long  distance  traffic.  These  could put competitive
pressure  on  traditional  licensed  operators.  Some  countries  such  as  Argentina  initially
prohibited  explicitly ITSPs  from offering voice  over packet (VoP)  services viewing them as
telecommunications  services  which are subject to licenses  as traditional circuit-switched  long
distance  services or as valued added services  subject to their own set of rules.  Others such as
Chile  have quickly  legalized  VoP, raising  the issue of discrimination  since  these companies
may not have the same  service obligations  as traditional  operators.  Most others  have not yet
issued opinions  on the matter,  in the best cases  leading to a wait and see strategy by potential
entrants  and  in the worst  cases  leading to conflicts  such as  in  Colombia  where the  gradual
approach  to market  liberalization appears  to be interfering with the much faster technological
4progress.  The cellular operator COMCEL started selling VoP services without a long distance
license.  All the existing  long distance carriers who had paid the required  $150 million for that
license  sued  immediately  revealing  the  difficulties  of  building  a  dynamic  vision  of
competition in this environment with changing technologies.
Second,  high  prices  continue  to  be perceived  as  an  issue  in the  region.  To  a  large
extent  this  is  a  result  of the  limited  competition  in  the  sector.  For  most  countries,  the
exclusivity  periods  granted  to  get  the  privatization  deals  done  resulted  in  lasting  high
connection  and usage tariffs.  Table  2 shows that  indeed residential  connection rates continue
to  be  high  when  compared  to  the  US  even  if they  have  gone  down  significantly.  These
exclusivity  periods  are now  coming to an end  as  in Argentina or Venezuela  and this  should
lead to  a reduction  in  tariffs  driven by  the  market.  However,  most countries  have  not  yet
defined  the rules of the  game  to ensure competition  in a sector where  costing the access  to
bottleneck  facilities continues  to be at the core of the regulatory debate.  Section 4  is devoted
to this key aspect.
Finally, there are concerns that tariffs may not have  dropped enough  and that demand
from  the  poorest  is  likely  to  be  rationed,  a  consequence  of the  continued  Latin  American
income distribution  problem. As of mid-1999  for instance,  only 10-15%  of the population had
the resources to get on line.6 This  is not a random  fact. A study of the distribution of the gains
from  utilities  privatization  in  Argentina  conducted  in  1999  already  suggested  that  unless
regulation  was effective  in  redistributing the  gains  to all users,  reform mostly  benefited  the
local  co-owners  of privatized  assets  (Chisari  et al.,  1999).  In  terms  of the  access to  new
technologies,  this implies that unless service obligations and ability to pay constraints are built
in  regulatory  decisions,  there  is  a  reasonable  risk  that  the  distribution  of the  benefits  of
reforms will reflect the current distribution of wealth.7 Section 4 discusses the instruments that
could  be  used  to  achieve  redistribution,  e.g.  via general  taxation  or  sector  specific  service
obligations.
6 Latincom (1999),  "Mass market internet still some way off in Latin America", June  16'h, p.  5.
7 See  the related  WIDER research  program  and also Estache,  Foster  and Wodon (2001),  and Estache,  Gomez-
Lobo  and Leipziger  (2001).
53. WHAT DRIVES CROSS-COUNTRY  DIFFERENCES IN INTERNET ACCESS'?
3. 1 A  naive look at the facts
Internet  has  the  potential  to  provide  a  wide  array  of benefits,  ranging  from  education  to
business opportunities,  hence  it is crucial to understand  how people have access to it. Internet
subscriber penetration  across Latin America  is about  1%. About 98% of these connections  in
1999 where through analogue modems. This correlation between telecoms  access and internet
access  is  illustrated  in Figure  1 for a  sample  of 20 Latin  American  countries  in  1999.  The
linear trend line provides quite a good fit.
Figure 1. A naive correlation between  telecoms  access  and internet use
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Table  3  summarizes  some  indicators  available  for  Latin  America  on  the  spread  of
internet  access  in the  region.  It  is interesting to be reminded  that for a large majority  of the
countries  of the  region,  internet  access  dates  from  the  second  half of the  1990s.8 T'able  3
shows that the number of internet  service  providers  (ISPs)  is generally high enough  in most
countries  to  suggest  that competition  is  generally  not  a major issue  in  this  specific  activity.
But usage charges continue to be quite high.  In  1999, the average cost to be on line conmbining
ISP costs and local call charges was US$ 52, twice the equivalent cost in the USA.
Table 3. Indicators of potential access  to the internet
Internet  ISPs  Internet  Internet  Internet charges  in  Personal  Cable TV
access  (1999)  hosts/10000  users  as %  1999 (US$  computers  subscribers
since:  inhabitants  of pop.  monthly cost of 20  (QOOs)  (OOOs) (1999)
(2000)  1999)  hours off peak)  (1999)
Argentina  1989  170  38.48  2.5  27.9  1,800  5890 (in  1998)
Bolivia  Jul.  95  9  1.14  0.4  15.07  100  70
8 As a side result of the differences  in penetration rates,  1999 business to business transactions  in Latin America
were  estimated  at  about US$  288  million,  with  about  2/3  concentrated  in  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Mexico.  The
equivalent figure  for the US was US$  114 billion.  See  Morgan  Stanley  Dean Witter  (2000),  The Latin  America
Internet Report,  February
6Brazil  1994  280  26.22  2.4  12.24  6,100  1,932
Chile  Jan. 92  26  26.42  4.2  19.12  1,000  656
Colombia  May 94  15  9.59  1.6  1,400  613 (in  1998)
Costa Rica  Jan. 93  2  20.47  3.9  20  400  75
Dom. Rep.  Jun. 95  7.89  0.3
Ecuador  Jan. 93  9  1.52  0.2  25  250  200 (in 1998)
El Salvador  Jan. 96  7  1.54  0.7  11.4  100  277
Guatemala  Dec. 95  10  8.3  0.6  22  110
Haiti  Nov. 96  0.1
Honduras  Jan. 96  17  7.6  0.3  40  60
Jamaica  Aug. 94  20  39.4  2.4  110  251 (in  1998)
Mexico  1989  148  40.88  2.6  25.51  4,300  1,984
Nicaragua  Feb. 94  7  2.04  0.4  19.48  40  310
Paraguay  1996  22  3.02  0.4  60  95
Peru  Feb. 94  54  3.0  1.5  21.99  900  380
Uruguay  Aug. 93  12  76.09  7.6  330  400
Venezuela  1994  32  5.91  1.7  1,000  600 (in  1998)
Source:  ITU
One of the most obvious explanations  for the continued high costs is the fact that there
still  are  strong  impediments  to  effective  competition.  Anecdotal  evidence  would  tend  to
confirm  this line of reasoning.  For  instance,  in Brazil,  which counts  about  50%  of all Latin
American  users, the high delivery costs for IP service results from the near monopoly position
of the  incumbent on international  gateways.  This is a problem for most potential entrants and
for users which  requires the creativity of service providers in finding various ways to finance
their services.  One example  is Bradeco  Bank.  It introduced  a free  access  internet  service  in
December  1999, in an attempt to adopt a business model based on advertising fees. The option
that  seems  to  be  most  widely  adopted  is  revenue  sharing  with  local  telcos,  following  the
European  model.  This  solution  will  require  some  regulatory  intervention  since  in  many
countries  local telecoms  are also ISPs9 and unlikely to work out deals that may hurt that part
of their business.
There  are of course other issues  revealed by Table 3. The clearest  among those is that
PC  penetration  continues to  be quite  low.  The percentage  of the population  who owns a PC
varies between 5 and  10% depending on the country. The equivalent share  is about 50% in the
US  or  around  20%  in  Spain  or  Portugal  for  instance.'0 While  cable  TV  does  offer  an
alternative  to phone  connections  to the  internet,  analysts  do not expect  this  access mode  to
represent an immediate viable solution."'
9 Think of the case of Telefonica who owns Terra Livre, a free internet access  provider.
10 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (2000), The Latin America Internet Report, February.
II  Latincom  quotes  forecasts  predicting  a  20%  share  of potential  internet  access  using cable  TV  by  the  year
2010; see Latincom  (2000)  ,"TV  sector primed for growth  as economic  recession lifts", June  5h. The equivalent
figure is currently 40%  in the UK and already above 20% in Spain or the European Nordic countries.
7A  comparison  of the various  pieces  of information  provided  in table 3 provides  also
some  interesting  stylized  facts  on the  linkages  between  reform,  income  levels  and  internet
access.  First,  two  of the  largest  users  of the  internet  (Uruguay  and  Costa  Rica)  have  not
restructured  their  telecoms  sector,  suggesting  that  the  correlation  between  telecom
restructuring  and  sector performance  is not 1. The fact that both countries  are small  and close
to countries  which have  undertaken  major liberalizations, thus providing  service  alternatives,
still hints to appropriate competitive environments  as key drivers.  Second, the table gives the
impression that internet  appears to  be something for the rich.  Figure 2 makes this impression
more  visual  by showing  the cross-sectional  correlation  between  GDP per capita and internet
access.  The  correlation  between  average  income  levels  and  internet  access  is  indeed  quite
obvious.  This tends  to  confirm  the  analysis of Norris  (2000).  Using  a cross-section  of  179
nations,  she  regresses the number  of people online  on variables  measuring  economic,  social
and political development.  She finds that only GDP per capita and the share of R&D spending
in GDP turned out to be  statistically significant.  Her point is  that economic  factors  outweigh
all others in predicting cross country differences in internet usage.
Figure 2. A naive correlation between  internet access  and GDP/capita
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Combining  the  information  in  Table  3  with  the  WIDER  data  base  on  income
distribution  provides  further food  for thought  on the use of internet.  Chile,  Costa Rica and
Uruguay  are  the  top three  users.  It  turns out that  Costa Rica  and  Uruguay  have  among the
least  uneven  income  distribution  in  the  region  while  Chile  is  a  country  in  which  even  if
income  distribution  has remained  stable,  poverty  has  been declining  significantly  in  recent
years. This would suggest that income distribution also matters. Figure 3 once more provides
a  simple visual  impression.  While  it  is not as convincing  as Figure 2, it hints  at  a negative
8correlation between  internet access and an indicator of inequality in income distribution such
as the Gini coefficient.
Figure 3. A naive correlation between  internet use and income  distribution
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Overall, these stylized facts  are a first attempt to qualify the more  blurred notion of a
digital  divide.  Income  is  what  matters  most.  A  richer  country  is  expected  to  have  more
internet  users.  Perhaps  a more  subtle result  is that,  for a given level of average  income,  an
additional  dollar  given  to the poor  more  than  compensates  for the diminished  internet  use
made by the rich from whom a dollar is taken away, resulting in an overall increase  in internet
access.
3.2. A more formal look at the facts
In the remaining part of this section,  we conduct a multivariate  analysis to investigate
if these findings  still emerge  after a closer scrutiny,  once additional  factors are also taken  into
consideration.  We are also interested  in trying to track down the relevance of policy variables.
We estimate a simple regression building on the naive correlations just discussed as well as on
additional  information  on internet  access  costs  and  on access  to complementary  equipment
(e.g.  computers)  as  determinants  of growth  in internet  access  and  use.  While  the  naive
correlations  in the preceding section exploit the cross country differences in internet diffusion
at  one  point of time,  in  the  rest of the  analysis  we  use  longitudinal  data  which  allows  to
control  for  country  (and,  at times,  continent)  fixed  effects  which  are  potentially  correlated
with  the  dependent  variables  and  might  lead to biased estimates  of the effect  of technology
and growth  on internet diffusion. By allowing for country specific fixed effects we attempt to
purge  our  estimates  of the  effect  of  unobserved  differences  in  internet  diffusion  across
9countries,  due,  among  others,  to  permanent  differences  in  educational  attainment  and
institutions.12
In  this  context,  the  inclusion  of access  costs  is  quite  crucial  since  one  of the  main
regulatory  issues  in the telecom  sector  is the design  of interconnection  access rules  and  its
implications  for  access  costs.  We  also test  if a model  of technological  diffusion  based  on
epidemic theories  of diffusion  may explain  internet access  in Latin America.  In our tests,  we
use two samples of data. The first is for the whole  World, testing for any regional  specificity
for  Latin  America.  The  second  focuses  on  Latin  America  only,  making  full  use  of the
additional institutional and technological  information available  for that region. The number of
explanatory  variables  is  drastically  restricted  by the data available,  however we do feel  that
the data bases are good enough to generate  some useful policy insights.
The specific model we use for the whole world is the following:
(1)  InHit = ao + a,lnYit + a2lnPit + a3lnL 1t + a4lnC 1 t + a5lnH1t1l
where,  for a generic country i in year t:
H: per-capita number of Internet hosts (Internet users in the second set of regressions),
Y: per-capita GDP,
P:  internet  access  cost,  defined  as the  sum of 30  3-minutes  local  calls  plus  monthly phone
subscription rates,
L: per-capita digital fixed telephone lines,
C: per-capita Personal Computers.
The  tests  that  focus  on  Latin  America  extend  model  (1)  to  include  additional
regressors,  namely  whether  or  not the incumbent operator  is privatized  in  a given  year  and
whether or not an independent regulator  is present in a given year. In some specifications,  we
also control for the degree of income inequality as measured  by the Gini coefficient.13
In  order to  check for the  robustness  of our results,  model  (1)  (and  its extension  for
Latin America)  is estimated twice, using two different dependent variables  H. In the first one,
we  use  Internet  hosts,  while  in  the  second  one  we  employ  Internet  users  (taken  from  a
12 For a recent survey of the concept and empirical  importance  of international technology diffusion see W.
Keller  (2001)
13 Data on Gini come from the Wider database.  Because data are not available each year, we have interpolated
the actual series with a linear trend and used the estimated value as a regressor.
10different source).14 The estimates refer to the period  1990-99.  Data come from the ITU/BDT
database  and from infoDev. All money variables (GDP and costs) are expressed in US$.
Eq.  (1)  is fairly  standard  and  only the  last term (dependent  lagged variable)  deserves
some  further  comment.  Such  term comes  from  a Gompertz  model of technology  diffusion,
quite  common  in  the  estimation  of the  sales  of relatively  new  products.  It  derives  after
positing  that the  number  of new  adopters  of a  certain  good  or  service  in  a  given  period
depends  both  on  the  maximum  number  of potential  users  (usually  a  fraction  of the  total
population)  and  on the number  of existing  users that may  "spread"  further  adoption.  These
models  typically  produce  life-cycle  diffusion  curves  over time,  with  an  introductory  phase
characterized  by  slow  growth,  a  growth  phase  reflecting  the  highest  rate  of  consumer
acceptance,  and  a  maturity  phase  where  the  product  reaches  its  point  of saturation.  The
Gompertz and the Logistic curves are probably the most popular in a wider class of curves.'5
Epidemic  models  can  be criticized  on several  grounds,  mainly because  they posit an
exogenous  process  that  does  not  model  explicitly  demand  and  supply  factors,  relying  on
primitive  treatments  of information  acquisition.  We  simply  intend  to  check  if the  lagged
dependent variable resulting from the stock adjustment process reflects  a diffusion process for
the internet  . If such  process  is found  in the  data,  one could  be tempted to argue  that Latin
America  is currently not doing particularly well simply because  it started the adoption  process
relatively  late in time.  If there are some  forces that drive  an exogenous  process of diffusion
(perhaps  not well specified, e.g.  imitation),  internet adoption should then converge towards an
equilibrium  level, raising the further question on the rate of convergence.  Our exercise  is also
motivated  by recent work of Kiiski  and Pohjola (2001)  who used a Gompertz  model  to test
Internet diffusion  in  OECD countries  and  in the  whole  world.  The basic  difference  between
our approach  and Kiiski  and Pohjola's  is that by using the panel  structure of the data, we can
control for unobserved  country specific characteristics  that are potentially correlated with the
included regressors,  and in particular with the lagged dependent variable.
In eq.  (1)  the  coefficient  a5 of the  lagged dependent  variable  should give  information
on the diffusion process. If there  is diffusion,  it is expected  to be positive but smaller than  1.
In the absence of diffusion, the coefficient should be 0.
The models are estimated via GLS with weights given by country population.  Standard
errors  are  robust  to  arbitrary  heteroskedasticity.  Because  of the  bias  of the  within  group
14 A host is a domain name that has an IP address record associated  with it. This would be any  computer system
connected to the Internet (via full  or part-time, direct or dialup connections).
5 See Stoneman (1995)  for a comprehensive  survey.
1  1estimator  when  the  lagged  dependent  variable  is  included  on  the  right  hand  side,
specifications  including the lagged dependent  variable and fixed effects are estimated via IV,
using  the  Anderson-Hsiao  estimator.  In the  regression  for  the  world,  the test  for  a  Latin
American specific  effect  is an F-test that the coefficients  on the right hand side variables  for
the  Latin  American  countries  are jointly  different  from  the  coefficients  for the  rest  of the
world.
3.3 The determinants of growth in internet hosts
Table 4 summarizes the results of two regressions testing the determinants of internet hosts in
the world. The first column  ignores  the possible  diffusion  and test for the relevance  of time
and country  fixed effects. The second column  summarizes the test of the diffusion model and
thus  include  a  lagged  dependent  variable.  The  models  are  estimated  including  additive
continent  and  year  specific  dummies  (to allow  for  allow  for unobserved  differences  across
continents  plus worldwide  macro economic  shocks), their  interaction  (to allow for continent
specific macroeconomic  shocks)  and additional  country specific fixed  effects, controlling  for
time  invarying  country  specific  characteristics.  Similarly,  when  we  run  the  regression  for
Latin  America only  we allow  for additive year  and  country  dummies.  P-values  are  reported
alongside the estimated coefficients.
A first important result emerging  from the  table  is that the coefficient  on the lagged
dependent  variable  is not  significantly  different  from zero.  This  suggests that the exogenous
diffusion  process  found by Kiiski  and  Pohjola (2001)  tends  to disappear  once  fixed country
effects are properly accounted  for. On the other hand, the lagged dependent variable would be
positive and significant if one allowed only for additive continent or year dummies  (results are
not reported here).  For these reasons,  specification  I is our preferred  one.
Table 4. Dependent variable: Ln hosts pc in the world
(first column is coefficient, second is  p-value)
2
Lagged dependent  -0.464  0.38
variable
Ln Gdp pc  0.713  0.033  0.935  0.122
Ln Costs  -0.345  0.109  -0.505  0.2 13
Ln Lines pc  0.573  0.06  0.758  0.068
Ln PC's pc  0.87  0.00  0.642  0.17
R2  0.996  0.993
Obs.  353  353
F-test for Latin America  1.41  0.211  1.01  0.403
All specifications control for additive year and continent effects,  interactions of the two and country effects.
12Specification  1 confirms the impressions  given by the stylized facts  reviewed earlier.
GDP/capita  is an  important predictor  of internet diffusion. A  10%  rise  in per capita  GDP is
associated to about a 7% rise in the number of hosts per capita, suggesting that the internet is a
normal  good. Access  to basic  infrastructure  such  as digital lines  and PCs matter (they enter
with  the  correct  signs  and  are  significant).  A  10%  PCs per  capita is  associated  to a  rise in
hosts per capita of about 9% (;z.878  *.1). Similarly, a 10% rise in fixed lines is associated  to a
rise in hosts percapita of about  5% (P.573  *.1).  Finally,  internet costs enter significantly  and
negatively.  A  10%  fall  in  costs  is  associated to  a rise in hosts per capita of about  3%.  This
suggests  that  regulators  should  indeed  be  concerned  with  policies  aimed  at  lowering  such
costs, both directly via Universal  Service Obligations  in rural areas, and indirectly promoting
competition  among  Service Providers and devising appropriate  interconnection  rules  since in
the majority of cases ISPs have to rely on the incumbent's  local loop to supply their services
to customers.
Table 4  also  provides a test of any Latin-American  specificity  (F-test).  The p-values
are well above any  standard critical value meaning that one cannot dismiss the idea that LA is
similar  to  the  rest of the  world.  Implicitly,  these  results  suggest  that  once  one  adequately
controls  for unobserved  country-specific  characteristics  which  do not covary over  time, the
different  performance of LA with respect to the rest of the world has mainly to be ascribed to
differences  in the evolution of the right hand variables rather  than differences  in the reaction
parameters.
Table 5 summarizes  the regressions  focusing specifically on Latin America only. Here
we  also  look  at the effects of regulation  and privatization  as well  as income  inequality.  The
first two columns report the same regressions as in Table 4 using all the available information
for LA  (60 observations).  In  column 3 to 5 we report the  results  on a restricted  sample  (34
observations)  corresponding  to  the  county-year  points  for  which  data  on  Gini  and  the
institutional variables are available.16
16 The countries  in the restricted  sample are: Argentina,  Costa Rica,  Ecuador, Jamaica, Honduras,  Mexico,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela
13Table 5. Dependent variable:  Ln hosts pc in Latin America
(first rolumn is coefficien  second is p-value)
_  a  ~  ~~  ~~  ~~~I  1  2  3  4  5 
entire  sample  Restricted  sample
Lagged dependent variable  0_;  _p.257  p.602  |  T  1  T  r  l 
LnGDPpc  1.822  .001  1.703  p.001  1.887  1.013  2.219  p.004  .460  p.002
Ln Costs  0.410  .282  -0.321  0.407  -0.956  0.004  -0.759  0.028  1.012  .)016
Ln Lines pc  1.227  .043  1.021  0.076  2.255  0.067  2.231  .011  .094  .072
Ln PC's pc  -1.062  .381  -1.248  0.348  -3.395  .037  -4.836  0.008  6.294  ).009
In  Gini  . _  -10.149  0.039  13.870  .010
Regulation  _  _  1.061  .070
Regulation*privatization  =  -1.076  .093
Obs.  60  30  34  34  34
R2  .984  .988  .988  .992  .994
All specifications  control for additive year and country effects
The table  confirms  the  rejection  of the  diffusion  model  for internet  hosts.  As  before,  once
country  fixed  effects  are  taken  into  consideration,  the  lagged  dependent  variable  is  not
significant.'7 Interestingly  the  In computer variable  enters with a negative sign. One possible
interpretation  for this  result  is that the  low  internet diffusion  is primarily  explained  by the
absence of adequate  infrastructures  (fixed  lines). At given fixed lines, a rise in the number of
PCs tends  to depress  internet  diffusion,  possibly  because  of the congestion  of the available
lines. 18
In  column  3 we  replicate  the  same  specification  as  in  column  1 on  the  restricted
sample.  The results  are similar, although the value of the  coefficients  is somehow magnified.
In column  4, we control  for the  log of the  Gini.  Inequality  seems to  matter substantially:  a
10%  fall  in the Gini (approximately  one  standard deviation  increase),  leads  to a doubling  of
internet  diffusion  (n10.149*.10).  This  is a remarkable  effect.  The  other coefficients  remain
essentially unchanged and still significant.
17  Some  caution  must  be  exerted  in  the  interpretation  of the coefficient.  The  Anderson  Hsiao  estimator  is
consistent for N (Number  of cross sectional  observations)  going to infinity.  Clearly,  when  we restrict to Latin
America  only, we are  short of fulfilling this condition.  Some caution must be exerted  in the interpretation  of the
coefficients.  The Anderson Hsiao estimator  is consistent for N (Number of cross sectional  observations)  going to
infinity. Clearly,  when we restrict to Latin America  only, we are short of fulfilling this condition.
18 As noted by a referee,  computers per capita might be endogenous to intemet  diffusion,  since the more people
use the  internet, the  higher  will  be  the  incentive  for others to buy a PC,  perhaps  due to a demonstration  or an
externality effect.  The direction of this bias, however,  is likely to lead to an overestimate of the coefficient: on log
computers.  Similarly,  it is worth remarking  that costs of access might be endogenous to intemet growth.  In this
case,  an increase  in the number of hosts would lower access costs through higher competition. On the other hand,
if higher access  costs attract  more  providers,  the bias  would  be  in the  opposite  direction.  Finally  note that GDP
per capita might  itself be endogenous to telecommunications  infrastructure  since the latter can affect  economic
growth (Roller and  Waverman,  2001).  In this case,  one would  reasonably suspect  that our estimate of the  effect
of GDP is upward biased.  Unfortunately  we do not have credible  instruments for these variables.
14In column 5 we include the institutional variables on whether the sector is regulated or
not  and  on  whether  this  has  been  privatized,  conditional  on  the  sector  being  regulated.1 9
Interestingly, the results  suggest that while regulation boosts internet diffusion, as soon as the
sector is privatized,  intemet growth returns to the pre-regulation  level.20
3.4 The determinants of growth in internet use
Rather than internet hosts,  we now consider internet users  (taken from  infoDev)  as our LHS
variable. As before, first we look at the whole world (Table 6), then Latin America (Table 7).
The  results  in  Table  6 suggest  again  that  there  is  no  sign  of diffusion  with country  fixed
effects taken  into account and specification  1 is the preferred  one. Coefficients have  the right
sign,  although  they are  less  significant  than before.  The  main engines  of growth in  internet
users  are  access  to PCs and  to phone  lines,  while GDP and  costs  seem to  matter less  once
fixed country effects  are  taken into account.  A  10% rise  in lines per capita tends to increase
the  number  of internet  users  by  about  2 and  a  half  times  as  much.  Also,  an  important
additional difference  with the focus on  hosts is that the F-test could not reject  the hypothesis
that LA countries are jointly different in terms of the determinants of internet usage.
Table 6. Dependent variable: Ln internet users pc in the world
(first column is coefficient,  second is p-values)
1  . _  _  2  l
Lagged dependent variable  -0.452  0.172
Ln Gdp pc  0.236  0.606  0.363  0.565
Ln Costs  -0.173  0.503  -0.29  0.383
Ln Lines pc  0.801  0.299  2.061  0.118
Ln PC's pc  2.182  0.00(  2.580  0.001
Obs.  383  383
R2  0.986  0.976
F-test for Latin America  2.53  0.041  2.86  0.024
All specifications  control for additive year and continent effects, interactions of the two and country effects.
19 Note that the privatization was preceded  by the establishment of a regulator in all the countries covered by the
sample  but this  is a somewhat misleading impression  of the diversity  in strength and independence  of regulatory
institutions. Argentina's regulator has grown to be significantly  more competent  during the 1990s to become  one
of the  most capable  towards  the  end  of the  period.  Many others  however  have  much  more limited  capacity to
tackle  the  problems they  are  expected  to  address.  In  addition  to regulatory  endowment problems,  capture  has
been  and  continues  to  be  an  issue  in  the  region  and  hence  the  Levy-Spiller  (1994,  1995  and  1996)  concerns
continue to be quite relevant even if they are not addressed  explicitly here.
20 Again,  some  care  must  be exerted  in  interpreting  these  results,  since  it might  well be  possible that  the  full
effects of regulation and privatization  haven yet not taken  place in LA.
15The  model  on  internet  use  relying  on  more  specific  information  on  Latin  America
(Table  7)  provides  interesting  additional  insights.  First,  GDP  and  PC  access  are  the
dominating  variables  when compared  to the determinants  of internet hosts. This explains the
rejection  of the  world-wide  model  for Latin  America  and  suggests  that the  determinant  of
internet use (as opposed  to the diff-usion of internet hosts) is somehow dominated by different
forces in Latin America.  A 10% rise in GDP  per capita increases the number of internet users
by about 13% (1.371*10%)  while a  10% rise in lines per capita tends to increase  the number
of internet users by about 7% (.735*10%).
Table 7.  Dependent variable: Ln internet users pc in Latin America
(first column is  coefficient, second is p-value)
1  1  2  3  r  4  r  5
entire  sample  restricted sample
Lagged dependent variable  =  =  -1.120  0.570  . _-
Ln GDP pc  1.371  0.008  1.622  0.053  0.358  0.687  0.478  0.324  0.314  0.573
Ln Costs  0.33  0.360  -0.686  0.377  -0.282  0.477  0.091  0.775  0.202  0.610
Ln Lines pc  0.735  0.061  1.432  0.291  0.033  0.950  -0.912  0.033  -0.728  0.094
Ln PC's pc  0.32  0.571  1.785  0.489  -0.477  0.327  -1.527  0.047  -1.44  0.093
In Gini  =  -10.49q  0.014 -10.204  0.041
Regulation  =  =  _  _  _____-0.168  0.582
Regulation*privatization  =  0.288  0.435
Obs.  63  63  36  36  36
R2  .979  .941  .984  .992  0.992
All specifications  control for additive year and country effects
Second,  internet  costs  become  somewhat  more  significant  when  compared  to  the
determinants usage  in the world - although not enough to be able to consider it to be  a clear
determinant  factor.  Again, the results are sensitive to the introduction  of specific controls.  As
above in Table 5, we restrict our sample to those countries with information on inequality and
institutional variables. Overall, our sample size  falls from  63 observations  to 36 observations.
A comparison  of columns  3 and  1 should  make us wary of the possibility  of extending  the
results  for  the  restricted  sample  to  the  whole  of Latin  America.  The  coefficients  change
significantly  suggesting that the restricted  sample might be non-randomly selected  in terms of
users  per  capita.  Again,  however,  inequality  enters  significantly  with  a  negative  sign
suggesting that a 10%  rise in the Gini halves internet diffusion. As before,  it is difficult to find
any  independent  effect  for privatization  and  regulation.  Lines  per  capita  now  enter  with  a
negative  sign  but  we  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  its  coefficient  is  statistically
undistinguishable  from zero at 5%  significance level.
164. WHAT ARE THE REGULATORY  POLICY IMPLICATIONS?
Both  the stylized  facts and the  econometric  results  suggest three clear  concerns with policy
implications:
*  Affordability matters as revealed  by the systematically significant sign  of GDP/capita
and the overall relevance  of internet access costs;
*  Access to basic telecom services matters as  indicated  by the systematic  relevance  of
the number of fixed digital lines per capita;
*  Access  to basic connection inffrastructure matters as  indicated  by  the  relevance  of
number of PCs per capita.
The  third  concern  fits  into  what  some  would  label  industrial  policy.  The  evidence
reviewed  shows that PC penetration  in the region  continues to be low and  is a major inhibitor
to internet penetration.  Mass  market computers (below $1,000)  are not that readily available
as  a  result  of continued  import  barriers  and  high  transport  costs.  Decisions  as  to  how  to
increase the number of PCs per capita have  implications  for many types of policies  and their
discussion  goes  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper.  The  first  two  concerns  however  can  be
addressed  by rather well-defined  regulatory  policies and  fit into the unfinished  reform agenda
mentioned  earlier.21 Access costs  in  regulated  activities are  driven by regulatory  guidelines,
confirming  the  importance  of the  outstanding regulatory  agenda.22 More  specifically,  access
and  affordability  must be  addressed jointly  by  the design  of regulation  to  ensure  that  the
expansion of the  internet usage  in the region  follows an expansion of the access  to telecoms
services. This will require  a higher phone penetration  and a much better integration  of the old
fixed  networks  with the  new  communications  tools.  The  main specific  concerns  regulators
should have in addressing these  issues  is the focus of the rest of this section.  We first review
the basic  technical  and  economic  features  of a communication  network,  next we tackle  the
access issue and finally conclude with affordability.
21  Remember we are not addressing the issues  relating to e-commerce  which raise many other regulatory issues.
22  Wallsten  (2001)  finds  in  an  heterogeneous  sample  of African  and  Latin  American  countries  that the joint
effect of privatization and  regulation  is significant and  positive on fixed network expansion; Gutierrez  and Berg
(2000)  also  find  significant positive  impacts  of the  regulatory  framework on  telephone  lines  per capita  for the
period covering 1985 to  1995 in a sample of 19 Latin American  countries.
174.1  Telecommunications  networks: a brief overview
Telecommunications  networks  are made of different components that can be broadly divided
into  two  main  elements,  switches  and  transmission.  Switches  allow  the  routing  of signals
throughout  the network,  while  transmission  supplies  the capacity  to  transport  the signal  in
various ways,  including wireline transmission (copper wires, cable, optical  fibre) and wireless
transmission  (satellite,  cellular,  microwave).  On  top  of  transport  facilities  and  routing
services,  at a higher layer value-added services are typically provided over a network.
Telecommunications  is a network  industry,  meaning that  final products  are made  of
interconnected  components  supplied  at  different  points  over  the  network.  The
interdependency  at the technological  level has its important counterpart  at the consumer  level.
Subscribers  want  wide  ranging  communication  devices  as  long  as connectivity  is  ensured.
This  phenomenon  is  known  as a network externality since  each subscriber's  willingness-to-
pay for telecommunications  services increases  with the size of the subscriber base that can be
potentially  contacted.  For  example,  suppose  that each  individual  gains  a benefit  of 1 from
being able to communicate with any other individual;  and suppose that there are N individuals
on the network. Then the total value of the network is the number of pairings N(N - 1), which
is close to N2 when N is large.  This square relationship  between the number of members of a
network  and  the  value  of the network  is  known  as  Metcalfe's  law.  There  are  also  indirect
benefits associated  with a large network. The more members of the network, the more likely it
is that new services will be offered over it.23
Network externalities  represent a plausible justification  for policies  aimed at tackling
the affordability  problem (section  4.5). A policy of universal access can be a way of inducing
"marginal"  consumers  to  connect  to  the  benefit  of everybody  when  the  private  benefit  of
joining a network  is lower  than the social  benefit that also includes  the benefit conferred  on
existing users.  It is also important to notice that network externalities have important strategic
implications since larger incumbents can block entrants by denying interconnection to them.
The layered  structure of a network  is crucial when considering the type of competition
that can be  envisioned  in the  industry.  The rewards  to an operator depend  on the degTee  of
interdependence  with services  offered by operators at other layers. If an operator  is integrated,
there is less risk that connectivity  is jeopardized;  however this may lead to excessive market
power  in the final  market.  Moreover,  this would  imply that every  operator can  supply  each
required  component, and this could  be unrealistic  or it could induce a wasteful duplication  of
23  See Katz  and Shapiro (1985)  and  Farrell and  Saloner  (1985,  1986)  for seminal  analyses  of positive  network
externalities.
18resources.  Hence,  there will  be "bottleneck"  facilities,  in the  hands of an operator,  that are
vital for the final provision of services offered by other operators.
In particular, the local loop represents the connection between the subscriber's premise
and the end office. It is still seen as the main bottleneck in the industry and it is pivotal in the
current  regulatory process.  The bottleneck  nature  can be  understood  by noting that the  link
close  to the customer  premise (the distribution plant)  is essentially  a fixed cost,  in the sense
that its  cost  is not  traffic  sensitive,  i.e.  it does  not vary  with the  subscriber's  usage.  If one
includes  also  the  local  switch,  some  elements  are traffic  sensitive  (interfaces  depend  on the
number of lines, etc.), however economies of scale would still be predominant.24
4.2 What's the access problem  in theory and in practice?
Suppose that you want to send an e-mail. For most of us, we would first access the Internet by
calling an Internet Service Provider  (ISP)  over a telephone line. The average  e-mail message
is broken  into around 20 pieces,  or packets,  by the sending computer.  These packets are sent
over  a standard  telephone  line to the  ISP, using  a modem  to convert the  computer's  digital
information  to the analog waves that telephone  lines transmit.  Each  packet  is transmitted  to
the nearest 'router': a special computer, dedicated to receiving  and forwarding packets,  that is
the Internet equivalent of a telephone switch. The passes each packet onto another router, or to
the destination  if it  is close enough.  Once  all the  packets arrive  at their destination,  they are
reassembled  into the original  e-mail and read. Of course,  each user does not care about which
routers  have handled the  individual packets  in an e-mail. What matters is the joint function of
all of the  components.  In the language  of economics,  the different  parts  of the network  are
called complements - items that are worth more together than separately.
All  this  turns  into  very  practical  issues  for  regulators.  First  of all,  it  is  clear  that
interconnection  should  be  mandated  to  ensure  complementarity:  if the  various  bits  are  not
interconnected the service would not work. This means that a technical problem of compatible
standards  and  interfaces  has  to  be  tackled.  This  is  probably  not  a major  problem  for Latin
America since the underlying technologies  are in any case developed  abroad and operators are
mainly users rather than  suppliers  of new technologies.  The type of intervention at this  level
24  On the other  hand, compared  with the provision  of access and  local calls,  long-distance  telecommunications
represents  a comparatively  favorable area for the  development of competition.  It is relatively straightforward  for
an entrant to establish  a rival  long distance  fiber optic  network,  possibly utilizing an existing infrastructure,  such
as canals  or railway  lines linking  major cities or high voltage transmission  networks.  Microwave technology  can
also be  utilized  as  a  stop-gap  mechanism.  This  observation  applies particularly  to  high  volume (thick)  routes,
which  are  capable  of sustaining several  operators.  Certain  low  volume  (thin)  routes  may,  however,  remain
effective monopolies.
19should  be minimal.25 In principle,  once technical  interconnection  is ensured,  the externality
problem  should disappear,  in the  sense that if all  consumers  are  interconnected  they benefit
from  the  network  effect  anyway,  independently  of  the  operator  they  subscribe  from.
Unfortunately,  the picture  is not  quite  so  simple  since  interconnection  is also  an economic
problem. Once a feasible interface  is established,  operators have to find ways of compensating
other operators for the use of the latter's infrastructure.
The most obvious solution is to let the parties negotiate an  interconnection  agreement
and this is what most regulators take as a first step,  as shown  in Table  8. This may actually
work  when  there  is  a  "double  coincidence  of wants"  between  the  two  interconnecting
operators,  i.e. when both operators  have  subscriber  bases of comparable  sizes  and need each
other  in  order  to  terminate  calls  destined  to  the  rival's  network.  In  Latin  America,  this  is
unlikely to be the case under the current conditions.  There is typically  an incumbent operator
that  is  integrated  over all the basic  components  of a network,  facing  entrants that have  only
parts of the infrastructure  and  need access  to some  elements of the incumbent  (typically,  the
local  loop,  as  we  discussed  in  the  previous  section).  In  that case,  entrants  depend  on  the
incumbent's facilities while the reverse  is not true. Negotiations  are then doomed to fail. As a
result,  the regulator  or the competition  agency  must act as a  referee.  The  first  step  for  the
referee is to identi.f costing rules ensuring that competition creates an interconnected  network
bringing  together  not  only  traditional  telecommunications  networks  but  also  all  the  new
Information  and Communications  Technologies  including mobile,  internet, satellite and cable
TV networks.
The  most  common  costing  rule  is  the  Long  Run  Incremental  Cost  (LRIC)  as  a
benchmark  to assess the costs  that will  have to be  covered  by interconnection  rates.  While
many have had to come up with estimates of these costs based  on international  comparisons,
only a few countries  in Latin America are developing their capacity  to actually estimate them
through a formal model.  Argentina and Peru are actually following the lead of the US after its
own  1996  Telecoms  Act which  required  the  FCC to  come  up  with a transparent  model  to
assess costs.26 Colombia  has  a very  impressive  proposal  to work along the  same lines.  The
expected  effects  on costs  are  dramatic.  The  initial  simulations  for Argentina resulted  in  the
25 In principle,  regulators could  ask operators to adopt particular standards  or technologies.  Despite this problem
is beyond the scope of this paper,  it may be worth saying that standards  often emerge  on a commercial  basis and
it is questionable whether  the  regulator  would  be able to  pick the best standard or technological  solution in the
first place. Technological  neutrality  while ensuring inter-operability  seems the best approach to regulation.
26 Benitez et al. (2001).
20ability of the regulator to get companies to cut connection  costs  from  2.35  cts/minute to  1.1
cts/minute.
Table 8. Basic interconnection  principles  in a sample of  countries
Nature of  Pricing model  Regulatory  Unbundling of
interconnection  approval of  facilities or of
charges  charges  accounts
Argentina  Commercial  LRIC  Y  Y
Agreement (CA)
Bolivia  Imposed by regulator  LRIC  N  N
(IR) + CA  _  _  _  _  _  _
Brazil  CA  N
Chile  IR  LRIC  Y  N
Colombia  IR  LRIC + FDC  Y  Y
Costa Rica  IR  OPPORTUNITY  Y  N
COST
El Salvador  CA  LRIC  N  Y
Jamaica  CA  NONE  N  N
Mexico  CA  LRIC  N  Y
Panama  CA  LRIC  N  Y
Peru  IR working as a cap  LRIC  Y  Y
+ CA_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Source:  ITU
Since so many in the region are working on the implementation  of a similar model,  it
may  be  worth  reviewing  what  theory  has  to  suggest  on  its  benefits  and  its  potential
limitations. LRIC is a measure of the true economic cost of an asset and sends the right make-
or-buy signal to alternative  suppliers  of infrastructure.  It is a long  run measure  of costs and
does  not  overestimate  the  value  of assets  as  it would  be  most  likely  done  if one  adopted
historic costs. This is quite important for countries  with a long tradition of accounting systems
distorted  by inflation  as  in Latin America.  Capital  is included in its measure (depreciation  is
rightly  considered  as an  economic  cost),  allowing  potentially  for  full  recovery.  In fact,  if a
new technology  were more  efficient  than  an existing  one  in  a competitive  market  with free
entry,  then entry would  occur  and prices would have  to equal  LRIC.  LRIC should represent
the long run equilibrium  level of charges, hence  it guarantees to achieve allocative  efficiency.
Although the details  are quite  complicated,  the underlying  principles  for its computation  are
the following:
*  Assets  are  valued  and  depreciated  on  a  current  cost  account  basis,  giving  the  current
replacement cost of a modem efficient asset;
*  Operating capital costs are grouped together according to the cost type and cost driver;
21*  Cost-volume  relationships  are  estimated  showing  how  these  costs change  over the  long
run with volumes of the relevant cost-driver;
*  Increments  are defined  and  the  model  determines  how much the  volume of a cost-driver
falls if an  increment  is  no longer  provided.  The cost-volume  relationships then  show the
cost saving. 27
It  is  important  to mention  the shortcomings  of LRIC  when badly  calculated.  Firstly,
LRIC is at odds with traditional  depreciation practices (typically straight-line).  In the presence
of technological  progress,  straight-line  schedules  would  underestimate  the  true  economic
annual cost.  Slow depreciation  schedules  may  be attractive  to regulators who can then obtain
lower current  prices  and  hence  encourage  entry.  However,  this  does not have any economic
justification  and  it is  also  sustainable  only  if the regulator  could  promise  at the  same  time
higher  future prices,  otherwise  investments  would  never  happen.  Secondly,  the  computation
of LRIC  is for an activity  which  is an  input to the production of two or more outputs, quite a
common  feature  in  telecommunications  (think  of exchange  switches).  The  definition  of
increments  turns out to be crucial  and  it  is often  dictated  by objectives other than efficiency.
Thirdly, LRIC  computations still involve a lot of discretion,  in particular  in the definition of a
sensible  cost of capital  in countries  with a high  degree of uncertainty  to be reflected  in the
minimum rates of return required to get the investors  to make the necessary  investments.
The  theory  behind  LRICs  is respectable,  but their  calculation  is  another  matter.  In
Latin America  it requires  a strong  commitment  to  come  up  with  reasonable  asset  valuation
rules supporting the development  of the model.  Reconciling  LRIC  and common  depreciation
practices  is quite  a challenge.  The very impressive  proposal  for the  implementation  of LRIC
in Colombia posted  on the web site of its regulators  ignores this issue. LRIC also assumes the
ability  of the regulator  to  assign  the various joint  and  common  costs  in  a  fair  way  while
common  practice  ends  up  with  arbitrary  rules.  This  is  why  the  case  of Argentina  is  very
interesting: the regulator decided to have a formal discussion of the actual allocation decisions
with all the operators before its adoption,  providing a quantifiable ground for discussion.
The calculation of  the LRIC of the bottleneck facility to which all new entrants want to
connect  is not the  end of the story. The next question to ask is how to use the LRIC  estimate
27 LRIC  can be  derived using bottom-up approaches  (based on engineering  estimates of the assets  and operating
resources  needed  to  provide services)  and top-down based  on existing  cost structures  reported  in the accounts.
Bottom-up  estimates are more precise in enabling  cost causation  for capital  assets to be identified (since they are
based on explicit parameters)  and easy to review.  But they  also bring many  areas  for disagreement,  for instance
22to set the access  price. This is quite critical since often access prices are over half of the costs
of downstream  entrants. Imagine the following  stylized situation. In  order to provide one unit
of final  good, downstream  firms need one unit of the upstream input that is produced  by the
bottleneck  owner at a unit LRIC  co in exchange  for a unit access  charge denoted by a. If all
firms in the downstream sector are similar (in terms of technology and thus of costs) and their
products  are  identical,  firms  undercut  each  other  until  price  competition  drives  to  zero  all
extra profits.  The price charged to final users ends  up equal to the marginal  cost of each firm,
which  amounts  to  the  sum  of the  access  charge  and  any  other  cost  incurred  in  order  to
transform the intermediate  good. If we denote the latter by c, the final price would be p = a +
c.  The  lower  the access  charge,  the  lower the  final  prices and the higher  the  total  quantity
consumed by the end-users.
Without  any other  source  of distortion,  the  best  that could  be  done  is  to follow  a
marginal rule: the  price to  the  final  user  (the  consumer  willingness-to-pay)  should  be  set
equal to the total marginal  cost of production.  The access price should thus be set equal to the
marginal cost of production (a = co) and in the end the consumer price would be p = c0 + c. On
the other  hand, distortions  in the incumbent's  retail prices typically exist for various reasons,
for  instance  because  the  bottleneck  involves  also  some  unapportioned  fixed  costs,  hence  a
marginal  rule would  not  allow  to  recover them.  Another  type  of distortion  arises  when the
incumbent's  prices  do not reflect  its cost  structure,  because the incumbent  is constrained  by
some  social obligations  to charge  identical  prices  in different  geographic  region - more on
the actual  importance  of social  obligations  in Latin America  later.  In these  circumstances,  a
marginal  rule  is  not  the  correct  benchmark  unless  additional  instruments  are  used
simultaneously  to  relieve  the  access  charge  from  additional  tasks.  Access  charges  purely
based  on LRIC are an appropriate  benchmark when retail-level  distortions are eliminated (for
instance  by tariff rebalancing)  or dealt with  using  other instruments.  On the other hand, the
common practice  to apply uniform  mark ups to the LRIC estimates to recover un-apportioned
costs does not reflect much economic analysis.
Table  9  summarizes  the  main options  for  access  pricing  under different  situations.2 8 A
quick  glance  suggests that the  rather complex theoretical  contributions  deliver one message:
the access charge is often performing too many tasks. The main  interest of the table  is that it
makes  the  point  that  different  goals  and  policy  objectives  lead  to  alternative  ways  of
on the definition  of "appropriate" equipment.  In contrast,  top-down approaches can reflect complex  networks and
do not omit costs. Their downside  is that they are more opaque,  hence they may hide inefficiencies.
28  For more details, see the surveys by Armstrong (2001a) and by Valletti and Estache (1999).
23calculating optimal  charges.  While it is true that theory is extremely useful to understand  the
mediating function  of access prices, we stress that one first fundamental  step should  precede
any access distortion:  whenever possible, the  use of access pricing as an instrument  for the
promotion of too many goals should  be resisted and other instruments  should be used.
Table 9. How to set an access charge:  what the theory says
Basic case  Access  Potentialproblems:  Eventual  remedies  (with  best  practice
charge:  examples):
First best  LRIC  May require  lump sums  *  tariff rebalancing (Dominican  Republic)
*  USO funds (Chile or Peru)
Second best  Ramsey(])  *informational  content  *  Global  price  cap  (under  study  in  Costa
*  may not be sustainable  Rica, Mexico, Peru)
Productive efficiency  ECPR (2)  partial rule
Extensions:
Entry promotion for:  Decrease  fixed  cost  may  not  be
* Product variety  recovered
*  Entry barriers  *  direct  explicit  or  implicit  subsidies
(through  differentiated  treatment  of
incumbent  and  new entrants  as  in  Brazil,
and maybe soon in Ecuador, Honduras)
* Learning-by-doing  *  equal access
• BN pass  Increase  small  entrants  *  Quantity discounts
* Cost duplication  disadvantaged
Market power  Decrease  fixed  costs  may  not  be  *  price regulation
recovered  *  competition  policy  (Argentina,  Brazil  and
Mexico  may be the most typical  examples
of an  effective  coordination  between  the
competition  agency  and  the  telecoms
:____  ____  ____  ____  ___  __  __ __regulator)
Notes:  (I)  Ramsey  prices  are  inversely  related to  the  elasticity  of  demand  and  apply  both  to  final  and  intermediate
services.  They  are  "second  best"  in  the sense that they  are the best that  the  regulator  could do  when  it cannot  repay the
incumbent's  fixed  costs  via  lump  sums, hence, the  wholesale  and retail  prices  alone  should recover the incumbent's  costs.
Ramsey  charges are a good  theoretical  benchmark  that says that markets are related so that demand  and supply  cannot be
considered  in isolation. They can be put in practice via global caps that put a limit to the overall price of a basket of services
(both retail and wholesale),  while the operator is left with the flexibility to set individual prices within the basket.29
(2) ECPR (Efficient Component Pricing Rule) states that the access charge  should be set equal to the direct cost of
supplying  access  plus the  opportunity  cost  represented by the  forgone profits  of the incumbent  when it is  displaced by an
access  seeker.  This  is  equal  to  the  difference  between  the retail  price  and  tie  cost  of the  competitive  segment.  ECPR
willingly narrows  its considerations  on the allocation of production  between the bottleneck proprietor  and its rivals. On the
theoretical  side, it introduces  the powerful  concept of opportunity  costs. On the practical  side, ECPR is a rather simple rule
guaranteeing  that only efficient  entrants  are granted  access.  It gives  valid guidelines  if there  is no problem of recovery of
fixed costs and static productive  efficiency  remains the only goal.  On the other hand, if not conjoined with complementary
instruments  (such  as final price  regulation, or price floors  and ceilings),  ECPR allows monopoly  rents and anti-competitive
conduct.
29 See Laffont and Tirole  (2000).
24Regulators  should  be  aware  that  there  is  a sequencing  of events  that  can  reduce  the
complexity of the access  problem.  For instance,  if the regulator believes there are barriers  to
entry,  the  tax/subsidy  issue of the entry  barrier  should  be  addressed  directly  and be  made
explicit,  rather than burying  it into the access pricing problem. The latter could  indeed be the
only option  available,  but  only  after  having  realized  that other  options  are  not  feasible.  A
similar  argument  can be  made  for universal  service  obligations  as  discussed  later.  In  other
words,  by  understanding  the  links  between  different  problems,  new  instruments  become
available that allow fine-tuning of the regulatory process.
Table 9 also deals with situations in which access  prices should be decreased compared to
benchmarks  in order to promote entry. Again, the first question has to be why entry should be
promoted. If this is because entry brings benefits  from product variety but there are barriers to
entry,  a simultaneous  effort should  be made to  remove them. This can be done by mandating
equal access for instance  and this  is the solution that has been adopted in Peru and Venezuela
where the law (in Peru) and the interconnection  regulation (in Venezuela)  explicitly states that
all interconnection agreements must reflect the principles of neutrality, non discrimination and
equal access.
The  consensus  approach  to coming  up with reasonable  estimates  of the  access charges
adopted by Argentina is quite  instructive.  From the viewpoint  of market liberalization,  sincet  l
1998, Argentina  has made most of the right moves. Argentina has opened the market, allowed
the  resale  of services  and  now  considers  all  operators  to  be  service  providers.  The  local
network has been unbundled.  Interconnection  has been set at incremental  cost. Argentina has
also  adopted  minimum  subsidy  auctions  for  the  yet  unserved  areas.  There  are  many
outstanding  issues  but the model  is well under way to be one of the most pro-market  in the
region  and  may  be  a  leading  indicator of things to come.  Since  1998,  the  regulators  have
recognized that details matter and  that the implementation  of many of the decisions required
some analytical  support.  In that context,  the telecoms  regulator  financed  the  estimation of a
cost model  for telecommunications  as a research project with the support of a research  grant
from  the  World  Bank  and  from  the  main  incumbent  telecoms  companies  concerned  with
difficulties on access  issues in preparation for the announced liberalization of the market.  The
research project brought together some of the top foreign academics  in the field of regulation
and  in  particular  access  pricing  (Jean-Jacques  Laffont  and  Bill  Sharkey  were  involved  in
identifying  some  of the  key  issues  in  conversations  with  all the key  players (operators  and
regulator)).  The  author of an equivalent  model developed for the U.S. was recruited to train a
team of young local researchers  who developed the local  model with his help.
25The process of model development may in fact have been one of the most useful aspects
of this experience.  Argentina  now has a cost model which has been used to assess LRIC in the
context of universal service obligations  and, had it not been for the recent crisis, it should now
have made a lot more progress on the access issue as well. In the mean time, Argentina is like
many other  countries  working  with  benchmarks,  but  many  of the actors  in  the  sector  are
hoping that once the macro situation is stabilized, the micro issue will again get the attention  it
deserves  from the key policymakers.  Good regulation requires  some initial  investment vvhich
is too often one of the first to be frozen under economic crisis situations.
4.3 How  to address the access  problem when investment is needed?
The second component of the regulatory challenge  is the need to encourage  investment. There
is a trade off between optimal access regulation in a static framework and in a dynamic one.  If
static  regulation  reduces  the  use  of monopoly  power  over the  infrastructure,  then  it  also
reduces  profits that  can  be  earned  by  the  investor/owner  of the  facility.  Access  regulation
setting interconnection  rates based  on simple  cost recovery rules,  while encouraging efficient
utilization  of assets,  may risk discouraging  investments.  The  reason  is simple.  If operators
rationally anticipate  that, once  somebody  has  invested, then the regulator will grant access at
cost, everybody will then wait for the investment to be done by somebody else and then seek
access.
This  is a typical free rider problem that may cause  big losses in  social welfare. At  best,
investments are  reduced;  in the limit there may even be no production  at all if no one invests
in infrastructure.30 At the same time, the regulator  should  promote the legitimate  objective  to
have a downstream  level playing fields.
Imagine  the typical  environment  for telecoms  operators  in Latin  America,  in  which  a
network  has  to  be  built  and  the  investment  cost  declines  over  time  due  to  technological
progress,  and  in  which  operators  are  left  to bargain  first  to  settle  interconnection  charges.
Incumbent  operators  must  first  decide  whether  and  when  to  invest  knowing  that  their
30 There  is  an obvious  parallel  between  this  problem  and  the kind of public policy  that  may  best encourage
innovative  activities  and the  dissemination  of Research  & Development  (R&D) efforts.  On the one  hand, once
one  individual  firm  has  acquired  knowledge  about  a  new  product  or a new  way to  produce  something,  it is
virtually costless to share this information with others.  Hence  the firm that has made the discovery should share
it with others,  and should compensate  only the long-run marginal costs. On the other hand, it is clear that such a
scheme  would seriously erode  any incentive  to pursue  any innovative  activity  in the  first  place. The  question  of
how to best balance  the aim of encouraging  innovative activity by protecting  intellectual property against the aim
of promoting the  competition  that such  protection  inhibits  has  been an  enduring tension  in policy  debates.  The
empirical  evidence  is far  from  uniform,  but one general  finding  seems to be robust and  relevant to the telecom
investment  issue:  R&D  intensity appears to increase  in industrial  concentration  but only  up  to a certain  value,
after which R&D efforts appear to level off or even decline.
26exclusivity period has or will soon end and that there are rivals deciding whether and when to
seek access.  A major element in  the bargaining game between the two parties  is the specific
design of the access rules defined by the regulator.
One could  think that if operators  offer sufficiently  differentiated  products,  there  should
not be  any particular  concern  since the  use of the  investment  is non-rival and  infrastructure
owners  do not fear the rent dissipation  caused by  downstream  competition  and thus have  an
incentive to optimize the use of the facility.  This conjecture  is not true. Negotiations  can only
be over variables that can be altered at the time of negotiation.  As the investment has already
taken  place,  infrastructures  themselves  are  sunk and  cannot play a  role during negotiations.
Thus  the provider  has a weak position.  By denying  the rival  the use of the  infrastructure,  it
gains nothing  and loses whatever  access charge  it might receive. The operator ends up with a
weaker incentive to invest even if  products are differentiated.31
There  is also  another  aspect that crucially  could affect the  scenario  which  the regulator
can use. The access  seeker may  be trying to become the provider itself and start selling access
to its rival.  In this case negotiations would be reversed.  There  is a potential for both firms to
"race"  in order to be the first to provide the infrastructure.  By doing so, an operator avoids the
access  payments  and  receives  access  payments.  This  gives  a  reason  to pre-empt  rivals  and
incentives  to invest are then raised. The race to become  the "common  carrier"  speeds up the
operators' choices.
Access  issues  become of greater concern when  firms  that use the infrastructure  are  also
direct  competitors  of the  infrastructure  owner  as  is  so  often  the  case  in  Latin  America.  If
competition effects  are extreme,  the infrastructure  owner will not grant access unless required
to.  Here regulation plays  a stronger role.  The entrant is  obviously keen on obtaining  access.
Without  compensation,  however,  the  incumbent  will wish to delay investments.  This can be
solved by requiring the  entrant to  bear  more of the costs.  But for the regulator this increase
might reduce the  possibility  of entry  itself. The  regulator  should try to manage  this tension
between investment incentives and timely competition.
The  point  that we  are  making  here  is that  an  access  price  regime  can  be  used  by the
regulator to create competition  between industry participants  over the provision of facilities. If
a firm "wins"  in the provision  of infrastructure,  it becomes  the common provider and  receives
access  payments  from  other  firms.  If it  loses,  it will either  pay for access  or duplicate  the
31  What we have just described here is a typical hold up problem due to contract incompleteness.
27infrastructure.  By  committing  to  an  appropriate  access  rule,  the  regulator  can  directly
determine the difference between winning and losing for operators.
The  existing  theoretical  literature  has  not come  up  yet  with  a  general  answer  to  this
intricate  problem.  The  possible  trade  off between  static  and  dynamic  efficiency  that  we
highlighted  at the beginning of this section  should  not be taken as the only possibility  since
regulation  interacts  with  other  important  variables  such  as  market  structure  and  entry
conditions,  competitive  behavior  of  market  participants,  and  technological  progress.  For
instance,  the unintended  outcome  of bad  regulation  could  be  to  achieve  low  levels  of both
static  and  dynamic  efficiency.  This  could  be  the situation  in  mobile  telephony  if too  little
spectrum  is made available to  a handful of companies that do not compete against each other
and do not need to adopt innovative technologies if they are protected against entry by licence
conditions.  Conversely,  under  some  circumstance  it  is  possible  to  achieve  the  best  of the
possible  worlds,  i.e.  high  levels  of both  static  and  dynamic  efficiency.  In  this  situation
operators  would  be  competing  against  each other,  achieving  relatively  efficient  allocations,
while still securing profits that create the incentive to invest.  The presence  of strong network
externalities can support a case like this one.
Only after unraveling the linkages  between entry,  investment, competition, and regulation
could  the regulator  understand  the  pros  and  cons  of basic  modes  of entry  and  eventually
promote  a  particular  one.  The  two  main  ones  are  facility-based  competition  (FBC)  and
service-based  competition.  In  telecommunications,  local  loop  unbundling  (LLU)  is a special
form of service-based  competition  that is particularly  important  in the current debate.  Under
FBC  both the incumbent  and the entrant  build their own  backbones  and local loop  facilities.
Customers can in principle  subscribe directly to both operators. The only relevant access price
is related to call termination on the rival's network.  Contrary to the previous case,  under LLU
the  entrant  leases  the  incumbent's  access  facilities.  On  top  of call termination,  regulatory
oversight should include the line rental that the incumbent receives from the entrant.
While the actual answer to the question FBC vs. LLU would need to be calibrated case by
case, we can highlight the main trade-offs clarified by economic theory:
*  If investments  are to  be promoted, there  is a potential trade-off between  ex post extraction
of rents and ex ante incentives.to  invest.
*  FBC  may  involve  unnecessary  duplication  of infrastructure,  and  in  this  respect  LLU
should be preferred.
*  However,  FBC  is  beneficial  when  it  brings  about  higher  speed,  less  congestion  and
product complementarities.
28*  LLU gives the regulator additional  regulatory instruments.  The downside is that regulation
also  becomes  much  more  intrusive.  Hence,  FBC  has  the  additional  benefit  that  the
regulator can rely more on direct competition than on regulatory intervention.
*  Flexibility should  be allowed  in different  respects.  The regulator should  offer a menu of
options  designed  in  a  way  such  that  particular  entry  modes  are  promoted.  Operators
should  be allowed  some  flexibility to  set their access  charges  subject  to constraints  on
their overall  level.
4.4 Summary tips on the choice  of a regulatory policy  for access
This  is probably one of most complex issues  in the  area of telecoms regulation  and there  are
many  aspects  we  have  not  touched  on.32 But the  preceding  quick  overview  of theory  and
practice  allows  the  following  conjectures  about  the key factors  which  should  influence  the
choice of a regulatory policy. Firstly, regulation can elicit excessive investment or, conversely
may  kill  most  investment  opportunities.  The  latter  is more  likely  than the  former  in  Latin
America.  This might happen,  for example,  if access  prices  were prohibitively  high,  leading
either  to  the  perpetuation  of a  monopoly.  Secondly,  willingness  to  invest  is  likely  to  be
influenced  by the perceived risk of investment.  There is thus value in either establishing a set
of (possibly changing)  access  pricing rules in advance,  or - at  least - a commitment  by the
regulator  to  criteria  set  in  advance.  Thirdly,  the  interaction  between  retail  prices  and  the
structure of access prices will have a major impact on incentives to invest in different  parts of
the telecommunications  network.  Rebalancing  the tariff will eliminate  some distortions,  but
continuing  geographical  averaging  will  also  limit  the  location  of  investment.  Finally,
flexibility should  be encouraged,  in terms of both allowing entrants to choose from a "menu"
of entry modes with possibly differentiated structures  of access charges, and incumbents to set
different charges subject to average constraints.
How  can the access  pricing  debate  be put  into practice?  It  is  quite obvious to  say that
regulators  should  try to employ more  sophisticated  economic tools and engineering  methods
to come up with a structured framework  that allows to use in an appropriate  way engineering
32 For  instance,  one may argue that once  facility-based competition  is mature, foreclosure  is not a great  danger
since  operators  would  have  an  incentive  to  conclude  successfully  commercial  negotiations  over  the
interconnection  terms.  This is probably true,  however some regulatory  scrutiny would still  be needed to restrain
various forms of anti-competitive  behavior.  For instance,  an  operator may be competing for customers but, once
it has secured some of them,  it has effectively  a monopoly power over the calls destined to them (this problem is
clearly  seen  in  the  context of fixed-to-mobile  calls).  Even  when  operators  are  competing  fiercely  both  over
termination and origination  of calls, they can  still use access prices  as an instrument of tacit collusion.  Collusive
(i.e.,  monopoly) prices  can  in fact  be  sustained using  high  access  charges because  of a raise-each-other's  cost
effect.  (Armstrong, 2001 a; Laffont and Tirole, 2000).
29estimates of costs. While this should be the aim of all regulators at least in the medium term,
one should also be realistic  and ask what they could do  in the initial phases when  such tools
and methods  are not available yet. The first thing that regulators  should do is to remove  most
entry  barriers,  such  as exclusivity  periods. Entry  in many cases  will alleviate the regulator's
problem to control  retail  prices.  In some areas  (such as densely  populated  areas  or business
districts),  the  regulator's  problem  may  actually  disappear  since  customers  may  have  the
possibility to choose among competing access providers. However,  we argued before that this
is unlikely and regulation of bottlenecks  is quintessential  in telecoms.
Entry  will actually  exacerbate  the access  problem  since  all  entrants will  have to rely to
some  extent  on  the  incumbent's  network.  Hence  the  regulator  should  first  ensure  that
interconnection  is  feasible.  But  at  what  price?  If no  information  is  available  at  all,  the
regulator  can follow only two routes.  It could either  look at international  benchmarks  and set
charges similar to those adopted  under similar conditions elsewhere,  or set a discount on the
incumbent's retail prices, along the lines of ECPR.33 Both approaches are not very satisfactory
but there not much more the regulator  could do if it has no other information  at its disposal.
Benchmarks are not very good  since they would be based on computations valid for countries
with very different economic conditions. ECPR would have limits  since it would  "freeze" the
structure of prices which could be inefficient if rebalancing had not yet occurred  and it would
oblige  entrants  to  replicate  more  or  less  the  incumbent's  prices  making  them  not  very
aggressive.  Given  that  these  options  would  be  the  only  ones  available  for  the  regulator
precisely when  it  is quite weak  in its infant  phase,  it is perhaps  advisable  to rely anyway on
international  benchmarks  since they are much less prone  to lobbying from  the incumbent.  In
any  case,  this  phase  should  be  as  short  as  possible.  The  regulator  should  try  to  adopt
engineering models, both to come up with reasonable figured and - more importantly - to set a
ground for discussion.
When estimates  become available,  then the economic analysis we discussed above should
be put into practice.  Tariff rebalancing,  access charges,  service obligations are all intertwined
aspects of the same  general  problem.  In this respect,  it  is perhaps important to stress that an
eventual  engineering  model  would  never  be  a machine  that gives  the  "right" number when
needed.  On the contrary,  it would only set an appropriate  order of magnitude;  besides this the
regulator  should  try  to  decentralize  decisions.  For  instance,  the  regulator  should  try to  set
some  price  cap  mechanism  on  access  charges  and  ask  the  incumbent  to  reduce  them  on
33 ECPR requires  only to compute the cost of the competitive  segment rather than the  bottleneck's cost which  is
much more difficult to compute.
30average by  some percentage  every  year,  reflecting the underlying technological  progress.  In
this  respect, the regulator  should avoid to  "crunch"  numbers from the engineering  model too
often,  otherwise  regulation  would  become extremely  intrusive and the incumbent  will never
have an incentive  to adopt cost-reducing  technologies  which,  in the  end, would  bring prices
down. Of course, there is also the risk that if the regulator does not scrutinize the incumbent's
behavior,  competition  could  be jeopardized.  In  this  respect,  while  in  principle  it would  be
ideal  that  the  regulator  is  also  able  to  monitor  anti-competitive  behavior,  in  practice  this
should  not  be  a priority  to the  extent to  which  the regulator  learns  to  co-operate  with the
competition  agency of the same country.
4.5 The affordability problem
The concern for affordability  is quite strong among policymakers  and is resulting in efforts to
get  tariffs  in  line  with  international  trends.  The  first issue  is that the  main  vehicle  to the
internet  continues  to be  through  phone  lines  and  that flat  rate  access  to local  calls  are  not
standard practice  as in the U.S..  Countries are working on this. In Argentina,  for instance,  the
creation  of special  internet price  schemes,  combined  with the reduction in the cost of leased
lines have  significantly  contributed  to the diffusion of the  internet.  Similar initiatives  can be
found  in  the  region  but  while  they  contribute  to  make  the  "haves"  better,  they  do  not
necessarily  do  much  for  the  "haves  not".  Indeed,  again  in  Argentina,  the  special  local
connection  number  for internet  users was  initially  not available throughout  the country  and
imposed  additional  long  distance  charges  to many  provincial  users.  And,  of course,  this  is
assuming  that telecom  penetration  is  sufficient  in  the  provinces  but  this  is  not  the  case.
Ultimately,  this is another  indicator that  in the  rush to close the digital  gap, the concern  for
basic failures  in the implementation  of the telecoms  reform  contributes  to the  digital divide.
The policy implication  is simple once more:  come up with a policy  instrument that get phone
lines where there are none.
The main  instrument  that has  been  used  by regulators  to  address  the affordable  access
issue  has  been  to  impose  universal  service  obligations  (USOs)  to  operators.  Table  10
summarizes  Latin  America's  experience  with  USOs.  According  to the  ITU regulatory  data
base, over  70%  of the  countries  of the region  include  basic  telephony  in their definition  of
universal services and about a third have now added electronic mail as well. Even if the table
suggests  that  general  principles  behind  USOs  are agreed,  the differences  in approaches  and
definitions across countries suggest implementation  challenges.  There are three aspects to this.
31First, what  exactly  should  be  provided  and  to whom?  Secondly,  who should  be required  to
fulfill a USO? Thirdly, who should pay for the costs of a USO.
The  exact  definition  of universal  service  varies  from  country  to country.  The  most
commonly used version refers to achieving a "minimum quality level" of a "basic package" of
services  to  all  consumers  and  at  "affordable  prices".  In general,  each  part  of the  specific
statements  are  open  to interpretation  - what  is a minimum  quality  level,  what  constitutes  a
basic package,  what prices  are  affordable?  Some  countries  list  a set of services  and  quality
levels that are  included  in  universal  service  (e.g.,  voice-grade  access  to the public  switched
network,  touch-tone,  etc.),  and  detailed  maximum  prices  that can  be  charged  for  specific
services,  and  on  average  across  all  services.  This  exercise  is,  of  course,  problematic.
Technological  progress  means  that  the  set  of basic  services  is  constantly  expanding,  and
minimum quality levels are ambiguous  (for example, wireless  services allow greater mobility,
but typically have lower sound quality and completion rates).
In spite of their popularity and their very practical  relevance,  USOs are under increasing
pressure  in  the  more  academic  literature  and  the  reasons  why  should  be  interesting  for
regulators.  The  first  source  of  pressure  appears  to  be  political,  but  actually  has  solid
economics  to back it up. A major problem with USOs is that they are blunt. A USO to cover
high-cost  rural  areas  at  the  same  price  as  low-cost  urban  areas  benefits  high  income  rural
consumers  at  the  expense  of low  income  urban  consumers.  More  precisely,  it  may  be
inefficient  to  effect  a  particular  objective  - higher  welfare  for  rural  residents  - through
distorting the prices of particular services. This point has been made formally by Atkinson and
Stiglitz  (1976),  who  show  that,  under  certain  circumstances,  the  best  way  to  redistribute
income  is through the taxation of income,  not consumption.  In their model, consumers  differ
in their income levels.  Hence their result speaks most directly to the issue of subsidies  to low-
income consumers.  It is straightforward,  however, to re-interpret their model in terms of low-
and high-cost consumers.  One of the key conditions  required  for this result is that  low-  and
high-income  consumers  have  the  same  relative  preferences  for  consumption  goods (i.e.,  the
marginal  rate of substitution  between consumption  goods is independent  of income).  In this
case,  taxing  consumption  - effectively  what  occurs  when  the  prices  of telecommunications
services are altered  - in order to fund universal service  is unnecessarily  inefficient.  The better
way to redistribute income (which, after all, is what a universal service subsidy does)  is to tax
income.  To  encourage  people  to  live  in  high-cost  rural  areas,  the theorem  suggests  that  a
location-specific  income tax break is better than offering  a telecommunications  subsidy. The
challenge  is  of course  to  find  a  location  specific  tax  that  is  consistent  with  the  social
32objectives to be addressed by the USO to begin with. When this is impossible, countries tend
to have no option but to rely on a sector specific tax. The latest example  is Argentina where
companies  are required  to put  1% of their gross sales into a government  run fund to provide
basic phone services in areas unattractive to investors.34
The second challenge facing USOs comes from  the introduction  of competition.  As seen
earlier  most  Latin  American  telecommunications  markets  have  been  opened  up  to
competition.  This has consequences  for the financing of USOs when  USOs are supported  by
cross-subsidization.  This cross-subsidization  is sustainable while a single firm operates  across
the various markets, as was the case in the U.S. and the U.K. until the early 1980s. But when a
second  firm  is  able to operate,  it will choose  to enter the  more  profitable  market-a  process
known as cream-skimming.  This has three implications.
Firstly, the distortions in prices that the USO requires can lead to inefficient entry.  When
there are retail distortions  due to a USO, then  a retail instrument  (such  as a tax funded via a
properly set fund) should be used. This can be done also in combination with an access charge
that would be set equal  to the marginal  cost of access.  Use of the access charge alone both to
provide the right entry incentives and to correct the retail distortion is inferior.35
Secondly,  the subsidy  required to  support the USO is higher than  it  is when entry cannot
occur;  since financing  the USO  is distortionary,  this means that the social cost of the USO is
higher. When consumers  are heterogeneous, with some being high-cost and others low-cost,  a
USO  subsidy set without regard to competition will be too low. The reason is obvious: such a
subsidy assumes that the operator  can earn  excess profits from  low-cost consumers,  that  can
be used to finance  service to high-cost  consumers.  Competition  eliminates these profits,  and
so increases the required subsidy.
Finally,  USOs  that  come  in  the  form  of a uniform  pricing  requirement  have  strategic
effects that need to be recognized by regulators.  Valletti et al. (2001)  show that a USO affects
the  way  in  which  operators  compete.  In  particular,  a  uniform  pricing  restriction  creates
34  Note  that  changes  in the  assumptions  underlying  the Atkinson-Stiglitz  theorem  will,  evidently,  change  the
result.  For  example,  it  may  be  that  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  consumption  goods  is  not
independent of income. Then it may be  worth taxing those goods that the rich have a relative preference  for and
subsidizing  the  goods preferred  (relatively)  by  the poor.  Nevertheless,  the result  is  important for emphasizing
that USOs must be  assessed carefully  for their  validity and not simply accepted as an all purpose  instrument to
address  the  financing  of access.  Gasmi  et al. (2000)  provide  a good  example  on  how to evaluate  alternative
subsidy schemes given  various configurations  of infrastructure costs and various degree of efficiency in the fiscal
system  (the  latter  affects  the  shadow  cost  of public  funds  that  would  have  to by  paid  if direct  subsidies  are
adopted).
35 See Armstrong (2001b).
33linkages  between  markets.  This  typically  make  operators  less aggressive  in those  markets,
leading to higher equilibrium prices and deadweight loss.
The  tension  between  universal  service  and  competition  represents  a  considerable
challenge  for  regulator.  The  case  of VoP  is  instructive.  Conflicts  as  those  discussed  for
Colombia earlier  are  likely  to grow  when  decisions  will  be made  on  whether  VoP leads to
direct competition  with companies with a USO or not. The situation is likely to get even more
complex  as  service  obligations  start  to  include  competitive  web  based  services  such  as
electronic  mail.  A promising  solution to resolve  this tension  is the use of universal  service
auctions,  in which operators  bid for  a level of subsidy  (competition for the market),  with the
market structure after the auction determined  by the bids in the auction. This has been tried so
far  successfully  in  several  Latin  American  countries  to increase  phone penetration  in  rural
areas.
To  give  an  example,  in  Chile there  have  been  successful  experiences  with the  use of
minimum  subsidy  concessions  to  expand  both  electricity  and  public  telephone  services  to
rural communities  since  1994.  This  is how  it works. There  is competition  between  regional
governments  for  central  government  financing,  between  rural  communities  to  have  their
project  sponsored  by  the regional  government,  and  between  utility companies  to win  the
concession to  serve a particular  rural community.  Concessions  are  awarded to the company
offering the largest reduction  to the maximum allowable subsidy  stipulated for each contract.
Service  expansion is co-financed by the state, the private  sector and the rural consumer.  State
contributions  are justified by the  fact that the  projects identified  have positive  social  returns
but  negative  private  returns.  Indeed,  it  is  this  differential  which  defines  the  maximum
allowable  subsidy.  However,  a  substantial  part of the  investment  costs are  financed  by the
private operator.  The  average proportion  for telecommunications  was  72% during the period
1995-97.  Customers  must  pay  regulated  service  charges  to  cover  the  unsubsidized  costs.
Concessionaires  are  free  to  choose  the  appropriate  technology.  Although  the  government
makes  certain  assumptions  about  technology  choice  in  computing  the maximum  allowable
subsidy, the winning bidder is free to select his own technological  solution. The results of the
programs have been encouraging.  About 80 percent of the rural population  now has access to
a public telephone. This progress was achieved at a cost of $2,300 per public telephone.  Unit
costs  have  risen  over  the  life  of the  programs,  probably  because  later  projects  have  been
targeted towards more isolated,  and hence more costly, communities.36
36 See Estache, Foster and Wodon (2001) for more details and additional references
34To  conclude  this  section,  we  summarize  the  most  important  problems  related  to  the
affordability  problem.  The first message to remember  that Universal  Service  Obligations  are
justified  on  efficiency  grounds  even  if it is  debatable  if they  are  also  called  for on  equity
grounds, since there may be better tools to achieve redistribution.  On the efficiency side, there
justification  stems  also  from  the  fact that they  can reduce  the  risk  that customers  may  not
subscribe to  a network since they do not take into account the benefit they confer on existing
users. Even if the marginal consumer  confers a small extemality,  this has to be multiplied by
large numbers. However,  it has to be clear that there are also limits to this kind of  justification
for  subsidies.  In  particular,  subsidies  should  be  at the margin and  it  is  not  necessary  to
subsidize the majority of infra-marginal  customers  that would be on the network without any
inducement.  In this respect, targeted programs  fare much better that uniform subsidies.  There
also  seem to be room for the introduction of more optional tariffs for local services. A "menu"
of contracts,  designed  having  in  mind  the  need  of the poor  and of the low users,  could  be
designed at a low cost in order to induce more people to subscribe without having to subsidize
the  large  majority  of the  population.  There  is no reason to subsidize  or maintain  artificially
distorted tariff structures in the belief that this is the only way to increase the subscriber base.
As said above,  affordability should be interpreted as affordability among an incremental  group
of users who are considering taking up or dropping the service.
On  the more  practical  side,  the experience  of the  90s has  clearly  shown  that regulators
should play carefully with USOs since they tend to be used by incumbents to extract too many
concessions.  Countries should distinguish  clearly between universal availability and universal
service  guarantees.  The former  is promoted  by encouraging  investments  and removing  entry
barriers.  Only  the  latter  should  be  explicitly  linked  to  possible  costing  and  financing
requirements.The  approach  should  be technologically  neutral,  enabling wireline  and wireless
technologies to be used to provide services.  Setting a rigid requirement for the functionality of
Internet  access  within the  defined  universal  service  package  would  prevent  mobile  services
from  fulfilling  the  universal  service  criteria.  It  is  important  to  maintain  incentives  for
competing networks and/or technologies to provide (part of) the universal service provisions.
A final point to remember  is that there are many ways of ensuring that costs are kept at a
reasonable  level. Using auctions  to assign USOs will help and the  regulator does not need to
calculate  net  costing.  There  are  also  problems.  It  may  be  difficult  to  have  sufficient
participants  bidding  against  the  incumbent  (in  many  cases  entrants  would  need  to  use
alternative  infrastructure  or acquire the use  of the incumbent's  assets).  Another  reason  is the
asymmetry of information between the incumbents and new entrants, for example concerning
35the costs and benefits  of serving groups  of customers.  If an auction  is not feasible,  then  the
regulator must calculate  the net cost and then  proceed  to financing  requirements.  Financing
these  costs  imposes  distortions  and  regulators  should  try to  minimize  losses  of allocative
efficiency.  The  least distortionary -way to finance  net costs  is probably from  the government
central  budgets.  Altematively,  funding  should  be  recovered  within  the  sector,  raising  a tax
from  the  broadest  possible  base,  in  order  to  minimize  the  impact  of the  financial  burden
falling on end-users.  The answer to this depends  to a great extent on the efficiency of the tax
system.
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This  paper  has  shown  that an  effective  implementation  of the regulatory  agenda  of
telecom reform can  indeed accelerate the adoption of the intemet - even  if it is only part of
the solution  since income levels,  income distributions and access to primary infrastructure  are
the main  determinants  of the  growth  in  connection  and use  of the intemet.  Regulation  will
work by  cutting costs.  Cost cutting  will  require the regulators  in the region to take a much
closer  look  at the design  of interconnection  rules  and  at the  trade-offs  that emerge  from  a
recognition of the complexity of the issue. It also requires a commitment to develop  analytical
instruments to sort out many of the  issues and to generate benchmarks much  more consistent
with the local issues and with the local cost of capital than intemational  benchmarks will ever
be for countries  in unstable macro  situations.  It will require an equally strong commitment  to
impose  regulatory  accounting  systems  that  reduce  the  information  asymmetries  which  are
used by incumbents to reduce the risks of entry.  It will finally require a stronger commitment
of competition  agencies  since  in  many countries,  the  failure  of negotiating  interconnection
agreements will raise competition issues just as often as they will raise regulatory issues.
There  are  many other outstanding  issues  we  have  not really  addressed  in the policy
part of the paper because there they deal with some supranational  aspects of the management
of the sector.  In  1999  for instance  the fact that Argentinean  intemet users were paying twice
what Brazilian  users  were  paying was  mostly  related  to the  cost of leased  lines.  While  the
price of leased  lines  is often  still controlled  by an  historical  incumbent or its successor with
strong  exclusivity  rights  who  runs  both  national  and  intemational  connections,  national
competition  and appropriate  regulation  are unlikely to be able to address that problem  alone.
Also,  the high  cost  for  non-US  ISPs  to  connect  to US  Intemet  backbones  with  a  pricing
36essentially designed  to get the rest of the world to subsidize the US use of the Internet  is not a
local issue.
In fine, it is going to be a while until  regulation manages to do what  it is supposed to
do.  It will require national  and international  commitments and much  more analytical  work to
turn  laws,  decrees  and  rules  into  practical  instruments  with  the  expected  impact  on
competition  and on costs. The scary part is that a demand  for new laws and new regulation is
already  emerging  with  the  information  revolution  well  before  the  first  wave  of  legal
instruments  have been  fully  enforced.  The  full  success  of reforms  and  its  fair  distribution
among  all  segments  of the population  will require  much  more blood,  sweat and tears  from
regulators than these have been willing to give so far.
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Bolivia  1995  1995  Partial  1995-2001  M  M  D  1995  Y  Reg. fee  Ministry
Brazil  1997  1998  Full  1998  p  P  P  1997  Y  Gvt + auction revenue  Ministry
Chile  1982  1987  Full  None  Full  Full  Full  1977  Y  Gvt  Ministy
Colombia  1991  Not yet  0  None  D  Full  D  1994  Y  Reg.  fee  Ministry
Costa Rica  1996  Not yet  0  M  M  M  1996  N  Reg. Fee + gvt  Parliam.
Dom. Rep.  1998  1999  Full  Full  Full  Full  1998  Y  Auction revenue + gvt  Public
._  _  _  _ _  _  _  .________  __________  _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  con troller
Ecuador  1995  Not yet  0  1995-2000  M  M  P  1995  Y  Auction revenue  Head of state
El Salvador  1995  1997/8  Partial  None  Full  Full  Full  1997  N  Auction revenue + gvt  Ministry
Guatemala  1995  1998  Full  None  Full  M  Full  1996  Y  Auction fee  Ministry
Honduras  1996  In process  0  1995-2005  Full  M  D  1996  Y  Gvt  Ministry
Jamaica  1989-91  Full  M  M  Full  1995  N  Reg.  fee  Ministry
Mexico  1990  1990-91  Full  1  1990-1996  Full  Full  Full  1996  Y  Gvt  Ministry
Nicaragua  1995  In process  1995-1999  M  M  Full  1995  Y  Auction fee  Head of
I_______  State
Panama  1995  1997  Partial  1997-2002  M  M  P  1996  N  Auction fee + gvt  Head of state
Paraguay  1995  In process  0  M  M  Full  1995  Y  Auction fee  Ministry
Peru  1991  1994  Full  1994-1999  Full  Full  Full  1994  Y  Reg.  fee  Ministry
Venezuela  1991  1991  Partial  1991-2000  M  M  Full  1991  Y  Reg. fee + gvt  Ministry





Level of competition:  M  = monopoly, D = duopoly,  P =  partial  competition, F  = full competition.  These definitions are taken from ITU and refer to the number of licenceees  rather than the actual  degree of competition.
Source: Authors'  compilation from  ITU, regulator's  web sites and World Bank intemal documentsTable 2: Evolution of selected  partial performance indicators in the sector
Main telephone lines Cellular subscribers  Faults per 100 main  Residential  Residential monthly
per 100 inhabitants  per  100 inhabitants  lines per year  connection rate (US$) Subscription  fee (US$)
1990  1999  1990  1999  1991  1998 or 99  1996  1999  1996  1999
Argentina  9.31  20.11  0.04  12.12  42.4  17.3  69  150  11.1  13.2
Bolivia  2.76  6.17  0  5.16  168  131  5.5  1.7
Brazil  6.5  14.87  0  8.95  4.5  3.2  1112  28  2.7  6
Chile  6.6  20.7  0.11  15.05  97  52  258  159  15.3  16.3
Colombia  6.91  16.03  0  7.53  80.4  56  321  181  2.9  3.8
Costa Rica  10.05  20.41  0  3.53  42.1  63  __58  5.3  3.9
Dom. Rep  4.76  9.81  0.04  5.02  98  98  6.6  6.6
Ecuador  4.78  9.1  0  3.09  197  82  167  136  1  1.7
El Salvador  2.42  7.61  0  6.22  297  331  7.1
Guatemala  2.13  5.51  0  3.05  258  223  0.7  0
Haiti  0.69  0.87  0  0.31  48  _ 5.7
Honduras  1.72  4.42  0  1.24  61.2  24  33  15  2.3  1.5
Jamaica  4.46  19.91  5.64  85.2  16  16  6.6  2.7
Mexico  6.48  11.22  0.08  7.94  9.4  2.2  III  14.5
Nicaragua  1.26  3.04  0  0.9  33_192  _  6.6  2.1
Paraguay  2.66  5.54  0  8.13  822  561  3.3  4.8
Peru  2.61  6.69  0.01  4.02  54  23.8  504  130  8.9  14
Uruguay  13.43  27.07  9.54  5.6  382  89  9.1  8.5
Venezuela  7.63  10.91  0.04  14.34  3.5  39  101  2.5  9.5
USA  >100  31.55  1  13.4  44  19.9
Source: ITUTable 10: Universal Service Obligations in Latin America
o C  USOs OBLIGATIONS  RETAIL SCHEME  FUNDING MECHANISM
5.  o  3  °
USOs FUND
CD  ci  t, 
a  =~~  o  F'.  r7  U,  a  0  C cr  ~~~02  . 0K  tHT U~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C  CAT  TX
Argentina  X  X  X  =  X  X  X  X  X  =  Pay or play
Bolivia  X  X  X  X37  X38  Government
Brazil  X  X  X39  x40  X
Chile  X  X  X  X  X41  X  Central gvt
Colombia  X  X  X  _  X42 Operator levy
Ecuador  X  X  X  World Bank  Technical
Ecuador  X X  X  assistance
El Salvador  _  X 
Dominican  X  _43  X  X  2% tax on subsc.  bills,
Republic  _  int'l settlements
Guatemala  _  X  X  X  X  _  X  Spectrum auctions
Honduras  _  X  X
Peru  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  _  Operator levy
Mexico  X  X  X  X  X  X  Virtual fund
considered
Nicaragua  X  X  X  World Bank Technical
assistance
Venezuela  X  X  X  44  X  X  X  X
37 Cooperatives  with rural obligations.
38 Telecom law of 1997 has provisions for using El Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional for funding rural telecoms,  no evidence of actual implementation.
39 The incumbent operators, no obligations  for the mirror license holders.
40 Virtual telephony.
41  To ensure the viability,  payphone operators are planning to charge higher interconnection  fees.
42 Social Telephony Fund.
43 DGT, Directorate-General  of Telecommunications  has operated rural telegraph system, but its to be discontinued.
44 Cellular operators are permitted to serve rural areas,  and have service expansion requirements.
Source:  Estache,  Foster and Wodon (2001) and data provided by Juan Navajas,  The World BankPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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